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PARTIES
Both the Plaintiff in the trial court proceeding and the Appellant in the immediate
appeal is Trillium USA, Inc. CTrillium").

Both the Defendant in the trial court

proceeding and the Appellee in the immediate appeal is the Board of County
Commissioners of Broward County, Florida ("Broward County"). There are no other
parties, either to the trial court proceeding or the immediate appeal.
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JURISDICTION
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§78-2-2(3)0) (1996).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
I.

Whether Florida law governs the parties dispute, either because the parties'

contract contains a valid and enforceable choice of law provision mandating the
application of Florida law, or because the pertinent conflict of laws analysis mandates that
Florida law be applied.
Whether the terms of a written contract form a valid and binding choice of law
provision is a question of law and is reviewed for correctness. See Nova Casualty Co. v.
Able Construction, Inc., 983 P.2d 575, 577-78 (Utah 1999) ("Interpretation of the terms
of a contact is a question of law. Thus, we accord the trial court's legal conclusions
regarding the contract no deference and review them for correctness."). Whether the law
of a foreign state is deemed to control under a conflict of laws analysis is a question of
law and is reviewed for correctness. See American National Fire Ins. v. Farmers Ins.
Exchange, 927 P.2d 186, 188 (Utah 1996) (reversing trial court's determination that Utah
law controlled after conducting conflict of laws analysis, stating "[w]e review the trial
court's conclusions of law for correctness, granting them no deference.").
This issue was preserved in the trial court by Trillium's Memorandum in
Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, which addressed this precise issue. Record
at 148.
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II.

Whether a Florida common law procedural rule regarding venue is sufficient to

preclude a Utah Citizen from maintaining an action in the Utah Courts against a Florida
defendant that has sufficient minimum contacts with the State of Utah.
Whether a trial court properly granted a motion to dismiss is a question of law and
is reviewed for correctness. Tiede v. State, 915 P.2d 500, 502 (Utah 1996) ("The
propriety of a trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to dismiss is a question of
law that we review for correctness.").

In addition, this issue also involves the

interpretation and application of a statute which an appellate court reviews for
correctness. Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234, 1240 (Utah 1998) ("Because a district
court's interpretation of a statute is a legal question, we review its ruling for
correctness.").
This issue was preserved in the trial court by Trillium's Memorandum in
Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. Record at 148.
III.

Whether a trial court may properly consider arguments not previously addressed

by the parties and raised for the first time by way of a Reply Memorandum in considering
whether to grant a motion to dismiss.
Whether a trial court properly granted a motion to dismiss is a question of law and
is reviewed for correctness. Tiede v. State, 915 P.2d 500, 502 (Utah 1996) ("The
propriety of a trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to dismiss is a question of
law that we review for correctness.").

346054.1

2

This issue was preserved in the trial court by Trillium's Motion to Strike
Defendant's Reply Memorandum, which raised this precise issue. Record at 229.
IV.

Whether Utah's venue statutes mandate that an action brought against a county of

a foreign state be tried exclusively in the county of that foreign state, thus mandating
dismissal of any such action brought in the courts of Utah. 1
Whether a trial court properly granted a motion to dismiss is a question of law and
is reviewed for correctness. Tiede v. State, 915 P.2d 500, 502 (Utah 1996) ("The
propriety of a trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to dismiss is a question of
law that we review for correctness.").

In addition, this issue also involves the

interpretation and application of a statute which an appellate court reviews for
correctness. Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.?d 1234, 1240 (Utah 1998) ("Because a district
court's interpretation of a statute is a legal question, we review its ruling for
correctness.").
This issue was preserved in the trial court by Trillium's Motion to Strike
Defendant's Reply Memorandum which sought in the alternative, permission to file its
Supplemental Memorandum in Response to Inappropriate New Arguments Raised in
Defendant's Reply Memorandum ("Supplemental Memorandum"). Record at 229-30.
Trillium's Supplemental Memorandum was proffered to the trial court as Exhibit "A" to

1 Assuming for purposes of argument, that the trial court could have properly considered
Broward County's arguments relating to the applicability of Utah venue statutes.
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Trillium's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike Defendant's

Reply

Memorandum. Record at 240-50.
V.

Whether principles of comity mandate that an action brought against a county of a

foreign state be brought exclusively in the county of theit foreign state, thus mandating
dismissal of any such action brought in the courts of Utah.2
Whether a trial court properly granted a motion to dismiss is a question of law and
is reviewed for correctness.

Tiede v. State. 915 P.2d 500, 502 (Utah 1996) ("The

propriety of a trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to dismiss is a question of
law that we review for correctness.").
This issue was preserved in the trial court by Trillium's Motion to Strike
Defendant's Reply Memorandum which sought in the alternative, permission to file its
Supplemental Memorandum in Response to Inappropriate new Arguments Raised in
Defendant's Reply Memorandum ("Supplemental Memorandum"). Record at 229-30.
Trillium's Supplemental Memorandum was proffered to the trial court as Exhibit "A" to
Trillium's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike Defendant's

Reply

Memorandum. Record at 240-50.
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-22 (1996):

2 Assuming for purposes of argument, that the trial court could have properly considered
Broward County's arguments relating to principles of comity.
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It is declared, as a matter of legislative determination, that the public
interest demands the state provide its citizens with an effective means of
redress against nonresident persons, who, through certain significant
minimal contacts with this state, incur obligations to citizens entitled to the
state's protection. This legislative action is deemed necessary because of
technological progress which has substantially increased the flow of
commerce between the several states resulting in increased interaction
between persons of this state and persons of other states.
The provisions of this act, to ensure maximum protection to citizens of this
state, should be applied so as to assert jurisdiction over nonresident
defendants to the fullest extent permitted by the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-13-3 (1996):
An action against a county may be commenced and tried in such county,
unless such action is brought by a county, in which case it may be
commenced and tried in any county not a party thereto.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case

Trillium has alleged that Broward County has breached the parties' contract by
wrongfully refusing to accept delivery of, and pay for, certain goods and services as
contemplated in the parties' contract.
B.

Course of Proceedings

Trillium filed its Complaint in this matter on April 30, 1999, alleging that Broward
County had breached its contractual obligations. Record at 1. On June 16, 1999,
Broward County moved to dismiss the action pursuant to Rule 12(b)(3) of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure. Record at 11. Trillium filed its Memorandum in Opposition to
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss on July 12, 1999. Record at 148. Broward County's
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Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss was filed on August 2,
1999 ("August 2, 1999 Reply Memorandum"). Record at 165. On August 16, 1999,
Trillium moved to strike Broward County's August 2, 1999 Reply Memorandum on the
grounds that it improperly raised arguments that had not been previously addressed by the
parties. Record at 229. In the alternative, Trillium sought permission from the trial court
to file a memorandum which responded to those arguments that were newly raised in
Broward County's August 2, 1999 Reply Memorandum.

Record at 230.

Trillium

attached its Supplemental Memorandum in Response to Inappropriate New Arguments
Raised by Defendant's Reply Memorandum as Exhibit "A" to its August 16, 1999
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike Defendant's Reply Memorandum. Record
at 240. Broward County filed its Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion Strike
Defendant's Reply Memorandum on August 30, 1999 and Trillium filed its Reply
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike on September 10, 1999. Record at 251;
Record at 258.

On December 1, 1999, the Honorable Judge Ronald E. Nehring

disqualified himself from the case. Record at 271. The action was subsequently assigned
to the Honorable Judge David Young on December 2, 1999. Record at 272.

On

December 29, 1999, counsel for Trillium filed a Notice to Submit with the trial court,
informing the trial court that both Broward County's Motion to Dismiss and Trillium's
Motion to Strike were fully briefed, that oral argument had been requested in both matters
and that Trillium requested that oral argument be heard on both motions at the same
hearing. Record at 278. On February 2, 2000, the trial court issued a Minute Entry
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setting oral argument on Broward County's Motion to Dismiss for February 25, 2000.
Record at 281. Oral argument was heard with respect to Broward County's Motion to
Dismiss on February 25, 2000 at the conclusion of which, Judge Young granted Broward
County's Motion. Record at 283. The Order of Dismissal was entered in this case on
March 8, 2000. Record at 284. Trillium timely filed its Notice of Appeal on March 24,
2000. Record at 288.
C.

Disposition Below

Broward County's Motion to Dismiss was granted by the trial court. The Order of
Dismissal was entered on March 8, 2000. Record at 284.
Oral argument was not heard with respect to, and the trial court did not rule upon,
Trillium's Motion to Strike. See Record at 281, 283, 284.
D.

Statement of Facts

1.

In August of 1995, Trillium entered into a contract with defendant and

appellee, Board of County Commissioners of Broward County, Florida ("Broward
County") to provide the parts and services necessary to convert certain of Broward
County's vehicles to run on natural gas. Record at 2, f 6; 162, f 3.
2.

The contract entered into by the parties was the result of Broward County's

unsolicited Invitation for Bid that was sent to and received by Trillium at its Utah
location. Record at 162 Tf 4.
3.

The contents of the Invitation for Bid were pre-printed and not negotiated

by the parties. Record at 162, f 7.
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4.

Included within the Invitation for Bid was a provision entitled "Legal

Requirements" which provided:
Applicable provisions of all Federal, State, County and local laws, and of
all ordinance, rules and regulations including the Procurement of Broward
County shall govern development, submittal and evaluation of bids received
in response hereto and shall govern any and all claims and disputes which
may arise between person(s) submitting a bid in response hereto and
Broward County by and through its officers, employees and authorized
representatives, or any other person natural or otherwise. Lack of
knowledge by any bidder shall not constitute a recognizable defense against
the legal effect thereof.
Record at 77, ^ 22.
5.

Trillium completed the Invitation for Bid at its Utah location and caused the

same to be returned to Broward County. Record at 162, <[ 5.
6.

No further contract negotiations of any substance were had between the

parties. Record at 162, % 6.
7.

Trillium's Bid was accepted by Broward County on August 15, 1995 and

Trillium subsequently began performance of its obligations under the contract. Record at
I62,1f3.
8.

On April 30, 1999, Trillium filed the immediate action in the Third Judicial

District Court for the County of Salt Lake, Utah, alleging that Broward County had
breached the parties' contract and damaged Trillium in the amount of $29,017.00,
exclusive of court costs, interest and attorney's fees. Record at 1-5.
9.

On June 16, 1999, Broward County, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(3) of the Utah

Rules of Civil Procedure, moved the trial court to dismiss the action, alleging: (1)
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pursuant to the "Legal Requirements" provision in the Invitation for Bid, the parties had
expressly agreed that the contract at issue would be governed exclusively by Florida law;
(2) Florida law would govern the dispute even if the parties had not so agreed; and (3) a
Florida common law rule regarding venue of actions brought against Florida counties
mandated that any and all suits against Broward County must be maintained exclusively
in Florida state courts located within Broward County. Record at 11-22.
10.

Trillium filed its Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to

Dismiss on July 12, 1999, contending that Trillium was entitled to its choice of venue as:
(1) the "Legal Requirements" provision included in the pre-printed and non-negotiated
Invitation for Bid did not constitute a valid choice of law provision mandating that
Florida law be applied; (2) under applicable choice of law principles, Utah law properly
governed the parties' dispute; and (3) even were Florida law deemed to govern the parties
dispute, Trillium was entitled to maintain the action in the Utah courts as the Florida
common law rule regarding venue was inherently procedural in nature, in direct conflict
with well established public policies of the state of Utah, and inapplicable outside of the
boundaries of Florida itself. Record at 148-59.
11.

In its Reply Memorandum filed on August 2, 1999, Broward County argued

for the first time that: (1) Utah venue provisions mandated that the action be tried in the
courts of Broward County and (2) principles of comity mandated dismissal of the action.
Record at 165-73.
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12.

On August 16, 1999, Trillium moved to strike Broward County's August 2,

1999 Reply Memorandum on the grounds that it improperly raised new arguments and
issues in contravention of established Utah law. Record at 229.
13.

In the alternative to its Motion to Strike, Trillium requested permission to

file a Supplemental Memorandum to address the new issues and arguments raised by
Broward County in its August 2, 1999 Reply Memorandum. Record at 230. Trillium
appended its Supplemental Memorandum in Response to Inappropriate new Arguments
Raised in Defendant's Reply Memorandum as Exhibit "A" to Trillium's Memorandum in
Support of Motion to Strike Defendant's Reply Memorandum. Record at 240-50.
14.

On December 2, 1999, the action was reassigned from the Honorable Judge

Ronald E. Nehring to the Honorable Judge David. S. Young. Record at 272.
15.

On December 29, 1999, counsel for Trillium filed a Notice to Submit with

the trial court, informing the trial court that both Broward County's Motion to Dismiss
and Trillium's Motion to Strike were fully briefed, that oral argument had been requested
in both matters and that Trillium requested that oral argument be heard on both motions at
the same hearing. Record at 278-79.
16.

Oral argument was heard with respect to Broward County's Motion to

Dismiss on February 25, 2000. Record at 283.
17.

During the course of the February 25, 2000 oral argument, Judge David S.

Young admitted that he had failed to read all of the briefs and other materials submitted to
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the court relating to the motions then pending before the court. Record at 302, p. 5, 1720.
18.

At the conclusion of the February 25, 2000 hearing, Judge David S. Young

summarily granted Broward County's Motion to Dismiss, despite the fact that he had not
read all of the pleadings filed with the Court. Record at 302, p. 5, 17-20; Record at 302,
p. 25, 7-11.
19.

The Order of Dismissal was entered by the trial court on March 8, 2000.

Record at 284-5.
20.

Trillium timely filed its Notice of Appeal on March 24, 2000. Record at

288.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
I.

Florida law does not govern the dispute between the parties. First, the parties'

contract does not contain a choice of law provision mandating that Florida law govern
any disputes between the parties. Nowhere in the clause at issue is the state of Florida
even mentioned. Further, the clause at issue, which was drafted exclusively by Broward
County, cannot reasonably be construed to imply that the parties mutually agreed that
Florida law would exclusively govern disputes between the parties.
Neither does the pertinent conflict of laws analysis require that Florida law be
applied to the parties' dispute. To the contrary, the majority of factors that must be
applied in any conflict of laws analysis favor the application of Utah law.
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II.

Even were Florida law deemed to govern the present dispute (which it does not),

Broward County would, nonetheless, properly be subject to suit in the courts of Utah.
Under well established rules regarding conflict of laws, even when the substantive law of
another state is deemed to govern the merits of a dispute, the procedural law of the
foreign state, such as the manner and method of bringing an action, remains wholly
inapplicable. The United States Supreme Court itself has held that statutes and rules
regarding venue are procedural in nature. Accordingly, even if Florida substantive law
applies to the immediate case, Florida procedural law, including any purported provisions
regarding venue, simply does not apply.
Further, any application of Florida law which serves to preclude an unwitting Utah
citizen, injured by a nonresident with sufficient minimum contacts with the state of Utah,
from maintaining an action in the State of Utah would run directly contrary to the explicit
public policies of this state and is therefore of no effect.
Further yet, the Florida common law rules regarding venue are totally inapplicable
outside of the state of Florida. Broward County failed to cite a single case in which the
Florida common law rule at issue was deemed to bar an action brought outside of Florida.
Nor did a search on the part of Trillium uncover any such case. The Florida venue rules
at issue are merely an intrastate housekeeping provision, inapplicable outside of the
state's own boundaries.
III.

Broward County's arguments pertaining to both the applicability of Utah venue

statutes and principles of comity were not properly before the trial court and therefore
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could not, or should not, have been considered by the trial court in its determination as to
whether the action should be dismissed. Neither the applicability of Utah venue statutes
nor comity principles were in any way addressed by the parties prior to Broward County's
Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. Well established
Utah law specifically limits a reply memorandum to the rebutting of matters set forth in
the respective opposition memorandum. Accordingly, those arguments, newly raised in
Broward County's August 2, 1999 Reply Memorandum, were not properly before the trial
court and should have been disregarded in their entirety.
IV.

Utah statutes regarding venue do not mandate dismissal of this action. The Utah

venue statute that Broward County has previously cited has application only to those suits
brought against Utah counties in the st^te of Utah. The statute has no application to suits
against Utah counties brought outside of the state of Utah, nor does it apply to suits
against counties of other states brought in the courts of Utah.
V.

Principles of comity do not preclude the present action. The case reporters are

replete with examples of actions in which counties and other municipal corporations have
been held subject to suit in foreign states. Those relatively few cases in which courts
have determined that foreign states or their subdivisions were improperly sued outside of
their respective home state and county, hinge largely upon unique factual circumstances,
none of which are present here. Further, a determination that foreign counties are
immune from suit in the courts of Utah would be diametrically opposed to important
public policies set forth by Utah statute.
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ARGUMENT
I.

FLORIDA LAW DOES NOT GOVERN OR CONTROL THE PARTIES
DISPUTE
A.

The Parties' Contract Does Not Contain a Choice of Law Provision
Mandating Application of Florida Law

The contract between the parties does not contain a choice of law provision
mandating application of Florida law. The contractual provision identified by Broward
County as purported evidence of the parties' express mutual assent to exclusively apply
Florida law merely states:
Applicable provisions of all Federal, State, County and local laws, and of
all ordinance, rules and regulations including the Procurement of Broward
County shall govern development, submittal and evaluation of bids received
in response hereto and shall govern any and all claims and disputes which
may arise between person(s) submitting a bid in response hereto and
Broward County by and through its officers, employees and authorized
representatives, or any other person natural or otherwise. Lack of
knowledge by any bidder shall not constitute a recognizable defense against
the legal effect thereof.
Record at 77, Tf 22.
A purported choice of law clause will only be enforced where it is "established to
the satisfaction of the forum that the parties have chosen the state of the applicable law."
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 187 cmt. a (1971). Further, "[wjhen the
parties have made such a choice, they will usually refer expressly to the state of the
chosen law in their contract, and this is the best way of insuring that their desires will be
given effect."
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contract are ambiguous, such ambiguity will be strictly construed against the drafter.
Zions First Nat. Bk. v. National Am. Title Ins.. 749 P.2d 651, 654 (Utah 1988).
As evidenced by its plain terms, the provision at issue fails to so much as even
reference "Florida." Even giving the provision the most generous of interpretations, the
clause, in simple terms, says nothing more than, "all applicable law will be applied." It
simply does not state, either expressly or implicitly, that the parties have agreed that the
law of Florida will exclusively govern any dispute arising from the contract. Certainly,
Trillium never understood the contract to contain such a choice of law provision. Record
at 162, f 9. As the sole and exclusive drafter of the provision at issued Broward County
easily could have included appropriate language expressly providing for a choice of law
provision.-* Broward County's failure Jo do so precludes any assertion that the clause in
dispute constitutes a valid and enforceable choice of law provision. See generally Zions,
749 P.2d at 654 (holding that failure of drafting party to include appropriate language
specifically spelling out the interpretation urged at court by drafting party mandated that
provision's ambiguity be strictly construed against drafter).

3

Record at 162,ffl[7-8.
4 It is interesting to note that elsewhere within the same Invitation to Bid, Broward
County specifically designated Florida as the controlling authority with respect to
particular contract provisions. For example, with respect to the requirement of Workers'
Compensation Insurance, Broward County specifically designated "the State of Florida"
as the applicable authority. Record at 80, % 6.1.
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B.

Conflict of Law Rules Dictate That Utah law Governs the Parties' Dispute

Where, as here, the parties have failed to make an effective choice of law, the court
determines which substantive state law will govern. American Nat. Fire v. Farmers Ins..
927 P.2d 186, 188 (Utah 1996). In making this determination, the Utah courts have
adopted the "most significant relationship" test as set forth in Section 188 of the Second
Restatement of Conflict of Laws. Id With respect to disputes arising out of contract, the
relevant factors to be considered are: (1) the place of contracting; (2) the place of
negotiation; (3) the place of performance; (4) the location of the subject matter of the
contract; and (5) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of
business of the parties. Id.; Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 188 (1971).
Application of the relevant factQrs to the present dispute evidences that Utah law,
not Florida law, properly governs the dispute between the parties. According to the
Restatement, place of contracting is determined according to the place where the last act
necessary to give the contract binding effect occurred. Restatement (Second) of Conflict
of Laws § 188 cmt. e (1971).

Admittedly, this last act occurred in Florida upon

defendant's acceptance of plaintiff s offer. However, as stated in the Restatement, "the
place of contracting is a relatively insignificant contact." Id, The second factor, place of
negotiation, is neutral. No negotiation of any substance or terms ever occurred between
the parties. Record at 162, ^f 6. Broward County provided Trillium with the pre-printed
Invitation for Bid and Trillium caused the Invitation for Bid to be completed and
returned. Record at 162,fflf4-5. No further negotiation occurred. Record at 162, Tf 6.
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The third factor, place of performance, favors Trillium. Indeed, the vast majority of work
performed by Trillium under the contract occurred outside of the boundaries of Florida,
and more particularly in the state of Utah. Record at 162, f 10. The actual vehicle
modification occurring in Florida comprised a relatively insignificant portion of the
overall work performed by plaintiff. Record at 163, f 10. The fourth factor, location of
subject matter, also favors Trillium as the relevant inquiry is not where the goods in
question ultimately ended up but rather where the goods originated. See Rocky Mountain
Helicopters v. Bell Helicopter, 24 F.3d 125, 129 (10 th Cir. 1994) (applying Utah rules
regarding conflict of laws and holding that Texas law applied because the subject matter
of the contract, a helicopter, originated in Texas). Most, if not all, of the parts and
components furnished to the defendant were gathered, assembled and shipped from
outside of Florida. Record at 163, If 11. The last factor, location of the parties is entirely
neutral. In sum, only place of contracting, a factor deemed by the Restatement as
insignificant, favors Broward County. Accordingly, the choice of law factors favor
application of Utah law, not Florida law.
II.

EVEN IF FLORIDA LAW APPLIED, DEFENDANT WOULD STILL BE
AMENABLE TO SUIT IN THE UTAH COURTS
Even assuming for the sake of argument that Florida law properly applied to the

immediate action (which it does not), Broward County is still amenable to suit in the Utah
courts. Well established rules regarding conflicts of law mandate that even where the
substantive law of another state is deemed to control, the procedural law of the foreign
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state, including rules regarding venue, are to be disregarded. Further, foreign provisions
of law which purport to preclude Utah citizens from maintaining an action in the Utah
courts against nonresidents with sufficient minimum contacts directly violates established
Utah public policies and hence are inapplicable. Lastly, the Florida venue provision at
issue is simply inapplicable to actions brought outside of the state of Florida. Broward
County has failed to cite a single case in which the venue provision at issue had been held
to bar an action brought outside of the state of Florida.
A.

The Florida Common Law Rule Regarding Venue is Procedural in Nature
and Thus Inapplicable

Under well established Utah law, even where the law of another state is deemed to
be applicable and controlling, the procedural law of that state, including those provisions
regarding the manner and method of bringing suit, is to be disregarded. Morris v. Svkes,
624 P.2d 681, 685 & n.3 (Utah 1981) ("it is our duty to apply the substantive law of [the
foreign state] to this controversy. Matters of procedure in a contract action are, of course,
governed by the law of the forum."); Records v. Briggs, 887 P.2d 864, 870 & n.14 (Utah
Ct. App. 1994) (holding that while another state's substantive law applied to action, other
state's statute of limitations was inapplicable as was procedural law); Financial Bancorp
v. Pingree and Dahle, Inc., 880 P.2d 14, 16 & n.2 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) ("The general rule
of lex fori requires that matters of procedure be governed by the law of the forum,
regardless of the parties' domicile, the law of the state in which the wrong was
committed, or where the contract was made or breached. . . . The lex fori rule applies
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regardless of a contract's choice of law provision selecting another state's law unless the
contract expressly provides for application of that state's [matter of procedure]."). The
distinction between substantive and procedural law has been defined as thus:
Uniformly, the substantive law is that part of the law which creates, defines
and regulates rights; whereas the adjective, remedial or procedural law is
that which prescribes the method of enforcing the right or obtaining redress
for its invasion. It is often said the adjective law pertains to and prescribes
the practice, method, procedure or legal machinery by which the substantive
law is enforced or made effective.
State v. Birmingham. 392 P.2d 775, 776 (Ariz. 1964). See also American Nat. Fire v.
Farmers Ins.. 927 P.2d 186, 189 (Utah 1996) (defining procedural law as those rules not
relating to "the substantive content of the contract or the rights of the parties to
damages."); Lilienthal v. Kaufman, 395 P.2d 543, 544 (Or. 1964) ("What is a matter of
substance and what is a matter of procedure are sometimes difficult questions to decide.
Stumberg states the distinction as follows: 'procedural rules should be classified as those
which concern methods of presenting to a court the operative facts upon which legal
relations depend; substantive rules those which concern the legal effect of those facts
after they have been established.'") (internal citation omitted) (cited with approval by
Utah Supreme Court in Morris v. Svkes, 624 P.2d 681, 685 n.3 (Utah 1981)).
Critically, as the United States Supreme Court has held, rules regarding venue are
"wholly procedural" and not substantive. Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad v.
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 387 U.S. 556, 563 (1967) (holding that amendment to
venue provision was to be applied retroactively as venue provision was "wholly
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procedural" not affecting "the substantive law applicable to the lawsuit." Further stating,
"No one has a vested right in any given mode of procedure.") See also Moore v. Agency
for Intern. Development, 994 F.2d 874, 879 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (holding that venue
provisions are procedural and not substantive) (citing Denver and Rio Grande Western
Railroad, 387 U.S. at 563.). Venue provisions merely pertain to the legal machinery by
which the substantive law is enforced or made effective. Venue provisions do not go to
the merits of an action.
Despite this controlling authority, Broward County asserts that dismissal is proper
because a Florida common law principle of venue purportedly allows a Florida county to
choose^ to be immune from suit anywhere but in its home county. Such common law
rules, however, go not to the merits of a dispute but merely serve to set forth the manner
and method of bringing an action. Therefore, the Florida venue provision is procedural,
not substantive. Accordingly, even were Florida substantive law applicable, Broward
County would still be amenable to suit in the courts of this state.

5 The Florida common law venue provision may be waived.
Singletarv, 610 So.2d 76, 77 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
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E.g., Mansfield v.

B.

The Florida Venue Rules at Issue Are Inapplicable as They Directly
Conflict with Well Established Public Policies of the State of Utah

The Florida common law yenue rules directly conflict with fundamental public
policies of the state of Utah and thus are inapplicable. The Utah state legislature has, by
statute, stated:
[that it is] a matter of legislative determination, that the public interest
demands the state provide its citizens with an effective means of redress
against nonresident persons, who through certain minimal contacts with this
state, incur obligations to citizens entitled to the state's protection.
The provisions of [the long arm] act, to ensure maximum protection to
citizens of this state, should be applied so as to assert jurisdiction over
nonresident defendants to the fullest extent permitted by the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-22 (1996). As evidenced by the above passage, it is the express
public policy of the state of Utah that its citizens be guaranteed the right to bring an
action against nonresidents in the Utah courts. Clearly, the possibility of bringing an
action in the nonresident's home state was deemed to be wholly inadequate by the
legislature.
In essence, Broward County urges this court to find that a common law procedural
rule of Florida abrogates fundamental rights guaranteed by the state of Utah to its
citizens. Such a finding, however, is impermissible. Only by a conscious and willful
waiver of the Utah citizen itself, may the right to bring an action within the Utah courts be
stripped away. Such a waiver did not occur here. To the extent that Florida common law
serves to prevent a Utah citizen from maintaining an action in state court it is in direct
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conflict with the public policies and statutes of the state of Utah and properly should be
disregarded.
C.

The Florida Venue Provision is Inapplicable to Actions Brought Outside the
State of Florida

The Florida common law rules regarding venue with respect to actions brought
against Florida counties are entirely inapplicable to actions brought outside of the
boundaries of the state of Florida. Broward County failed to cite a single case in which
the venue rules at issue have served to bar an action brought outside of Florida. Nor did
Trillium uncover such a case. As evidenced by those cases cited by Broward County, the
venue provision at issue is an intrastate house keeping rule applied exclusively by the
Florida courts to actions arising in the Florida court system. Nothing in the cases cited by
Broward County even intimates that the Florida common law venue rule has been, or
should be, applied outside of the Florida court system.
III.

DEFENDANT'S REPLY MEMORANDUM IMPERMISSIBLY RAISED
NEW ISSUES AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISREGARDED BY THE
TRIAL COURT
Broward County's August 2, 1999 Reply Memorandum raised issues addressed

neither in Broward County's initial Memorandum in Support nor in Trillium's
Memorandum in Opposition and therefore should have been disregarded in its entirety.
Well established Utah law mandates that every reply memorandum must be limited in
scope to rebutting the matters proffered in the respective opposition memorandum. State
v. Blubaugh, 904 P.2d 688, 701 n.8 (Utah Ct. App. 1995); Maack v. Resource Design &
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Const,, Inc., 875 P.2d 570, 575 n.3 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); State v. Phathammavong, 860
P.2d 1001, 1003-004 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). Further, "the rule is well settled that the court
will not consider issues raised for the first time in a reply brief." Blubaugh, 904 P.2d at
701 n.8 (quoting Phathammavong, 860 P.2d at 1005)); Maack, 875 P.2d at 575 n.3
(same); Phathammavong, 860 P.2d at 1004 (quoting White v. Kent Medical Ctr. Inc., 810
P.2d 4, 8 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991)). As stated in Phathammavong:
It is the responsibility of the moving party to raise in its . . . motion all of
the issues on which it believes it is entitled to [prevail]. Allowing the
moving party to raise new issues in its rebuttal materials is improper
because the nonmovingparty has no opportunity to respond."
860 P.2d at 1003-04 (alterations and emphasis in original) (quoting White v. Kent
Medical Ctr. Inc., 810 P.2d 4, 8 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991)). Claims that new arguments set
forth in a reply memorandum are actually inherent or implicit in the original motion and
memorandum are completely unavailing. R.D. Merrill Co. v. Pollution Control Bd„ 969
P.2d 458, 473 n.10 (Wash. 1999) ("A party responding to a . . . motion should not have to
guess what additional issues may be 'inherent' in the motion.") Nor does the fact that
counsel may not have contemplated new arguments prior to receiving an opposition
memorandum serve to excuse the inclusion of new arguments. White v. Kent Medical
Ctr. Inc., 810 P.2d 4, 8 n.l (Wash. Ct. App. 1991).
Broward County's Motion to Dismiss, as evidenced by Broward County's initial
Memorandum in Support, was premised solely upon the contention that the parties and
the Utah courts were, as a matter of law, bound by a particular Florida common law
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provision regarding venue. Record at 20-22. Trillium's Memorandum in Opposition
responded to that argument. Trillium directed the trial court's attention to the fact that the
Florida common law provision put at issue by Broward County was wholly procedural
and thus, according to well established rules regarding conflicts of law, of no effect upon
the Utah courts. Record at 154-57.

Trillium further noted that application of the

particular provision at issue would be in direct contravention of the important public
policies of the state of Utah as set forth in statute by the Utah legislature and was merely
an intrastate rule without effect beyond the borders of Florida. Record at 157-59.
Conceding defeat on the merits of its Memorandum in Support, Broward County's
August 2, 1999 Reply Memorandum made no attempt to rebut the matters raised in
Trillium's

Memorandum

in

Opposition,

rather

Broward

County

attempted,

impermissibly, to proffer two completely new arguments for dismissal. Broward County
belatedly contended that Utah venue statute themselves commanded dismissal. Record at
166-67. Further, Broward County asserted for the first time that principles of comity
precluded the Utah courts from exerting jurisdiction over it. Record at 167-73. Both
arguments were, and are, in error, but of perhaps more importance is the fact that
Broward County was strictly foreclosed from even making those arguments at that
juncture in the proceedings.
Broward County's violation of well established Utah law prohibiting the raising of
new issues by way of a reply memorandum was exacerbated by the fact the Honorable
Judge David S. Young admittedly failed to read all of the briefs and other materials
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submitted to the trial court with respect to those motions pending before it prior to
granting Broward County's Motion to Dismiss. Record at 302, p.5, 17-20. As Trillium's
Supplemental Memorandum was attached to the last pleading filed with the trial court
prior to the hearing on Broward County's Motion to Dismiss, it appears possible, perhaps
even likely, that the trial court based its decision to dismiss the action, at least in part,
upon those arguments newly and inappropriately raised by Broward County without even
considering Trillium's response to such arguments. Indeed, Judge Young indicated at the
virtual beginning of the February 25, 2000 hearing that he had, in essence, already
decided to dismiss the action, this despite his admitted failure to even read all of the
pleadings filed with the trial court. Record at 302, p. 3-4, 5.
Well established Utah law man4ates that a reply memorandum be restricted to the
rebuttal of matters raised in the respective memorandum in opposition.

Broward

County's August 2, 1999 Reply Memorandum blatantly disregarded this command and
raised new arguments for which Trillium was unable to properly respond. Accordingly,
the trial court should have disregarded Broward County's August 2, 1999 Reply
Memorandum in its entirety.
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IV.

UTAH VENUE STATUTES HAVE NO APPLICATION TO THE PRESENT
SUIT6
Utah statutes relating to venue of actions involving counties and other municipal

corporations are not applicable to the present action. Specifically, section 78-13-3,7
dealing with venue of actions involving counties, is strictly limited in scope to actions
involving Utah counties, brought in Utah courts. Of Hansford v. District of Columbia.
617 A.2d 1057, 1061-62 (Md. 1993) (Rejecting contention that Maryland venue statute
had application to suit against District of Columbia brought in Maryland courts, stating "a
Maryland municipality, sued in a Maryland court in a transitory action, should be sued
where it is situated. The District of Columbia is not a Maryland municipal corporation
and is not situated in a Maryland county. In the context of this case, it is a nonresident
corporate defendant."). Section 78-13-3 does not bar actions against Utah counties from
being brought outside of the state of Utah. Nor does the provision preclude actions
against foreign counties from being brought in Utah courts. Broward County failed to
cite any authority for the contrary proposition. Further, whether a county or other form of
municipality may be properly subjected to suit outside of its home county and state is a
question of jurisdiction, not venue. Annotation, Right to Lay Venue of Action Against

6 Assuming for purposes of argument, that the trial court could have properly considered
Broward County's arguments relating to the applicability of Utah venue statutes.
7 "An action against a county may be commenced and tried in such county, unless such
action is brought by a county, in which case it may be commenced and tried in any county
not a party thereto." Utah Code Ann. § 78-13-3 (1996).
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Municipality in County Other than that in Which it is Situated, 93 A.L.R. 500, 509 (1934)
("the question whether a municipality can be sued in a state other than that of its situs
would appear to be one of jurisdiction rather than venue... ."). Accordingly, section 7813-3 does not bar the present suit.
V.

PRINCIPLES Oi COMITY DO NOT SERVE TO PRECLUDE THE
PRESENT SUIT8
Principles of comity do not serve to prevent Trillium from maintaining this action

against Broward County in the courts of Utah. Contrary, to Broward County's assertions,
the vast majority of courts^ that have considered the issue have not found the exercise of
jurisdiction over foreign states and their subdivisions to be improper under principles of
comity. 10 The relatively few instances in which courts have declined to exercise such

8 Assuming for purposes of argument, that the trial court could have properly considered
Broward County's arguments relating to principles of comity.
9
R&, Hansford v. District of Columbia, 617 A.2d 1057, 1062 (Md. 1993) ("We agree
with the majority of jurisdictions which today reject the notion that a municipal
corporation is exempt from the venue principles governing other corporations.").
10 The following is a non-exhaustive list of examples in which it was determined that the
exercise of jurisdiction over foreign states or their subdivisions was proper: Nevada v.
Hall 440 U.S. 410 (1979) (upholding decision which rejected claim that Nevada statutory
provisions regarding venue and liability limitations should be observed in suit brought in
California); Biscoe v. Arlington County, 738 F.2d 1352, 1358-60 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(rejecting County's contention that it should be immune from suit under principles of
comity); Skipper v. Prince George's County, 637 F.Supp. 638, 639-41 (D.D.C. 1986)
(rejecting contention that venue for action against county was improper in D.C. court);
Peterson v. Sate of Texas, 635 P.2d 241, 243 (Colo. Ct. App. 1981) (holding that "there is
no immunity, by law or as a matter of comity, covering a sister state [for harm caused
Colorado citizens]"); Kent County v. Shepherd, 713 A.2d 290, 298-300 (Del. 1998)
(holding that public policy as evinced by state long arm act precluded claim that foreign
(footnote continued on next page)
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jurisdiction have, as a general rule, been dependent upon the presence of unusual
circumstances, none of which are present here.
The United States Supreme Court has made it abundantly clear that there is no
constitutional impediment to a foreign state or its subdivision being sued in the courts of a
sister state. Nevada v. Hall 440 U.S. 410 (1978). A state may, however, accord a sister
state and its subdivisions immunity from suit as a matter of comity. Id. at 426. In
determining whether to extend comity, "[o]f primary importance is whether the public
policies of the forum state would be contravened if comity were extended." Jackett v.
L.A. Dept. of Water and Power, 771 P.2d 1074, 1076 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). All other
considerations are ancillary. Id While the extension of comity calls for an exercise of

(footnote continued from previous page)

county and state should only be sued in home county); Streubin v. Iowa. 322 N.W.2d 84,
87 (Iowa 1982) (holding that state's interest in protecting citizens outweighed Illinois's
interests in limiting liability); Hillhouse v. City of Kansas City, 559 P.2d 1148, 1151(Kan.
1977) ("Today there is no sound reason why a foreign municipal corporation should be
treated any differently than foreign private corporations."); Hansford v. District of
Columbia, 617 A.2d 1057, 1062 (Md. Ct. App. 1993) ("We agree with the majority of
jurisdictions which today reject the notion that a [foreign] municipal corporation is
exempt from the venue principles governing other corporations."); Wendt v. County of
Osceola. Iowa, 289 N.W.2d 67, 69-70 (Minn. 1979) (holding that state's interests in
protecting its citizens precluded county's assertion that it could not be sued outside of
home county); Hernandez v. City of Salt Lake. 686 P.2d 251, 253 (Nev. 1984) ("The City
of Salt Lake also argues that it should be immune from suit by citizens of this state in our
courts because its statutes would protect it from suit in Utah. We decline to grant the city
such protection in our courts."); Mianecki v. Second Judicial District Court, 658 P.2d
422, 424-25 (Nev. 1983) (holding that state's interest in protecting its citizens mandated
that jurisdiction be exercised over state of Wisconsin); Ehrlich-Bober & Co., Inc. v.
University of Houston, 404 N.E.2d 726, 730 (N.Y. 1980) (rejecting claims that Texas
venue provisions should be given effect under principles of comity).
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judicial discretion, the legislature may, by statutory enactment, remove an issue from the
realm of comity and judicial discretion. Pan Energy v. Martin, 813 P.2d 1142, 1146
(Utah 1991).
The Utah legislature has, by statutory enactment, set forth important public
policies which preclude the extension of comity under the present circumstances. The
Utah legislature has, by statute, stated:
[that it is] a matter of legislative determination, that the public interest
demands the state provide its citizens with an effective means of redress
against nonresident persons, who through certain minimal contacts with this
state, incur obligations to citizens entitled to the state's protection.
The provisions of [the long arm] act, to ensure maximum protection to
citizens of this state, should be applied so as to assert jurisdiction over
nonresident defendants to the fullest extent permitted by the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-22 (1996). Inherent in the long arm statute is the purposeful
determination that the availability of redress in the non resident's home state is wholly
insufficient. Id

See also Kent County v. Shepherd, 713 A.2d 290, 300 (Del. 1998)

(holding that Delaware long arm statute "was intended to 'avoid the necessity of
following a tortfeasor to his [or her] place of domicile in order to obtain redress for his [or
her] tort.'") (alterations in original) (internal citations omitted). The public policies
encapsulated in the long arm statute are of such paramount importance that the Utah
Supreme Court has decreed that the Utah courts "must" exercise jurisdiction over non
residents to the outermost limits of the Constitution. Starways. Inc. v. Curry, 980 P.2d
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204, 206 (Utah 1999); Synergetics v. Marathon Ranching Co., 701 P.2d 1106, 1110 (Utah
1985).
In stark contrast to the important public policies inherent in the Utah long arm
statute, venue provisions (such as the Florida provision at issue) which purport to limit
where states or their subdivisions may be sued are enacted merely "to serve the
administrative convenience of the state." Ehrlich-Bober & Co., Inc. v. University of
Houston, 404 N.E.2d 726, 730 (N.Y, 1980) (rejecting claims that Texas venue provisions
should be given effect under principles of comity). See also Hillhouse v. City of Kansas
City, 559 P.2d 1148, 1151 (Kan. 1977) ("We have concluded that the rule which
establishes a special privilege in favor of foreign municipal corporations so as to exempt
them from suit in the court of Kansas i? not in harmony with modern conditions nor does
it meet the demands of justice in our present society."). A state's interests in adherence to
venue restrictions are even weaker where the cause of action arises out of a commercial
transaction. Ehrlich-Bober, 404 N.E.2d at 731.
In short, the important public policies encompassed within the Utah long arm
Statute prohibit the court from giving effect, as a matter of comity, to the venue and
immunity arguments urged by Broward County.

C£ Kent County, 713 A.2d at 301

("The Delaware Long-Arm Statute . . . reflect a coherent and comprehensive public
policy which prohibits a Delaware Court from recognizing, as a matter of comity, either
the absolute or the limited sovereign immunity arguments that have been asserted. . . .").
Such a conclusion is wholly consonant with the commands of the Utah Supreme Court
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and the Utah long arm statute which mandate that Utah courts exercise jurisdiction over
non residents to the full limits of the Constitution. Moreover, by enacting the Utah long
arm statute and its attendant statement of purpose, the Utah legislature has removed from
the Utah courts discretion to grant immunity to a foreign state or its subdivision under
principles of comity.
A contrary result is not mandated by the authority previously cited by Broward
County. Those courts which have, under principles of comity, granted effect to a foreign
state's request of immunity have done so in large part under circumstances not present
here. It is certainly true that in Jackett v. L.A. Dept. of Water & Power, relied upon
extensively by Broward County, immunity was granted as a matter of comity. 771 P.2d
1074 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). However, pven a cursory examination of the facts underlying
the decision reveals the fallacy of Broward County's reliance upon the decision. First and
foremost, the plaintiff in Jackett was a California resident, not a Utah citizen. Id. at 1077.
Thus, the important public policies underlying the Utah long arm statute were completely
inapplicable in Jackett. Further, the Jackett plaintiffs only purpose for bringing suit in
the Utah courts was to circumvent his failure to comply with the statute of limitations of
California. Id. No such facts are present here. Lastly, the Jackett court determined that
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the public policies of Utah would not be adversely implicated upon refusing to allow suit
under the peculiar circumstances present. Id. 1 1
By contrast, Trillium is a Utah citizen. Record at 2, f 1. Further, unlike in Jackett,
Trillium is not trying to resurrect a claim lost under Florida law. There is apparently no
question that Broward County is amenable to suit with regards to the underlying matter.
Lastly, and most importantly, acceding to Broward County's belated requests for
immunity would be completely contrary to definite and unequivocal legislative
expressions of public policy.

The legislature has guaranteed that Utah citizens be

afforded the right to maintain an action in the courts of Utah against those non residents
who have minimum contacts with the state. The Utah Supreme Court has interpreted this
statute to mandate that Utah courts exercise jurisdiction to the fullest extent permissible
under the Constitution.

Trillium is entitled to maintain this action against Broward

County in the courts of Utah.

11

The remainder of cases previously cited by Broward County are also largely
inapplicable. For example, in Baldwin Enterprises, Inc. v. Warwick, 545 A.2d 201 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988), the decision to grant immunity from suit as a matter of
comity turned in large part upon the existence of unsettled questions regarding New York
laws relating to public bidding. Id at 203. In Lee v Miller County. 800 F.2d 1372, 1378
( 5 ^ Cir. 1986), the decision to grant immunity as a matter of comity was in large part
dependent upon the existence of a civil defense compact between counties of the two
states and the fact that the injury complained of resulted out of operations associated with
that civil defense compact.
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CONCLUSION
The trial court's Order of Dismissal should be reversed. This Court should rule
that Broward County is properly amenable to suit in the courts of Utah. This Court
should remand the action for further proceedings consistent with these rulings.
DATED thisc5/ day of June, 2000.
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